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Judge Brown, of the Southern District of New York, has
held in two recent cases that the exemptions of the third
Harter Act,

section of the Harter Act (Feb. 13, 1893), do not

Application apply to injuries to passengers or to claims for
loss or damage to their personal baggage ; The Rosedqle, 88
Fed. 324; Moses v, Packet Co., 88 Fed. 329. He based his opinion upon the reasoning in the case of The Delaware, I6l U. S.
459, where it was said that the only object of the act is "to
modify the relations previously existing between the vessel and
her cargo," and also upon the fact that section three of the
act is expressly limited in its application to vessels "transporting merchandise or property." "The Persia," said the learned
judge, "carried merchandise as well as passengers; but there
are many vessels that carry passengers only, and to those
vessels the act cannot apply, But it is not conceivable that
Congress intended by this act to discriminate between these
two classes of vessels in respect to their liability for negligent
injuries to passengers, and to provide that the one class should
be exempt from liability and the other class not exempt, simply
because the former carries merchandise and the latter does
not:" 88 Fed, 330 ,
That mortgages have never received much consideration in
the admiralty courts when in conflict with maritime liens is
well known, and consequently the postponement
Motgage
of one to a lien for supplies, though conferred by
a state statute, is not surprising, although no reasons are given:
The Crescent, 88 Fed. 298.
Anyone who, while in a small boat, has been passed by a
large steamer, has realized how tremendous are the waves
swells near

caused by the latter's motion, and has seen that

they may be a source of danger to vessels moored
at the piers of a port. He will, therefore, feel that the decision
in the case of The New Hampshire, 88 Fed. 306, holding her
liable for damage done to The Yarrowdale at Pier i, North
Piers
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River, New York, was correct. The following language of'
Brown, D. J., is clear and sensible:
"In passing the slips a steamer is bound to go at such
moderate speed and at such a distance away that her waves.
will not do damage to ships properly moored in the slips that
she passes. The size of each steamer's waves when theyreach the slips depends upon her model, the speed of her
propeller, and her distance from the docks; and every steamermust take the risk of regulating her speed and distanceaccordingly."

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

An attorney's implied powers on behalf of his client arelarge, but have their limitations. Chicago Gen. Rwy. Co. v.
Stipulations Xrray, 51 N. E. (Ill.) 245, holds that in
at Trial
condemnation proceedings an attorney, unless
specifically authorized thereto, has no power to stipulate on
behalf of the company how land taken by the right of eminent
domain shall be used.
ASSIGNMENTS.

In Bennett v. Sweet et al, 51 N. E. 183, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held, in accordance with the prevailing rule,
Verdict for that a verdict for personal injuries is not assignPersonal
able, and therefore it could not be reached,
Injuries

before judgment, by a creditor of the plaintiff.

(See note in this issue.)

ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.

Wilson v. Sax, 54 Pac. (Mon.) 46, a long case chiefly concerned with the proper form of attachments under the Montana
statute, is of general importance only in so far as
Preferencesit

reiterates the familiar rules (I)that, in the

absence of statutes, preferences by failing debtors are lawful
even in favor of their own relatives, whether in the form of a
judgment or a payment in cash or property; and (2) that the
burden is heavy on creditors of a man who has assigned for
creditors, to prove fraud in the assignment. A large number
of apparently suspicious circumstances were held not sufficient
for the purpose.
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A passenger, a feeble old lady, encumbered with a heavy
valise, was assisted on the train by her husband, the plaintiff.
No assistance was afforded or offered by the
Injury to
The stop at the station was not long
Passenger's carrier.
enough to allow the plaintiff to alight, and after
Escort
the train had started, the conductor told him to " get off." In
so doing he was injured. Verdict for plaintiff was affirmed :
Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co. (Supreme Court of South
Carolina), 31 S. E. 212.
The weight of authority favors the right of a railway
company to grant out the exclusive privilege of" plying" the
trade of carrier of passengers or baggage on the
Hackmen
The Supreme Court of
Soliciting on company's grounds.
Connecticut is in accord: New York, N. H. & H.
Roniway
Orounds,
R. R. v. Scovill, 41 Atl. 246. The railroad comExclusive
pany was here held a competent party to sue for
Privilege
.an injunction to prevent the violation of this privilege. But
the court expressly declared that the rule could not operate
"to prevent the driver of any vehicle from entering the station
grounds of the plaintiff to fulfill a contract of employment
with a passenger .... "

-CONFLICT OF LAWS.

The principle that the right of recovery in tort must be
recognized by the lex loci delicti, as well as by the lexfori, has
been applied by the Supreme Court of New HampTorts,
shire to the case of suit for an injury received while
Injury in
.Another State travelling for pleasure on Sunday, contrary to the
on Sunday lex loci: Beacham v. Portsmouth Bridge, 40 At.
Io66. Suit was brought against the proprietors of Portsmouth
Bridge for an injury, due to defendants' negligence, received on
that portion of the bridge within the State of Maine. After the
injury in question, the law of March 21, 1895 (Laws 1895, C.
129), was passed by the Maine Legislature, providing that c.
124, Rev. Stat. of Maine, relating to the observance of the
Lord's Day, shall not affect the right or remedy of a party
growing out of an injury received on that day. The rights of
plaintiff, however, were, of course, governed by the law as it
existed prior to the enactment of this Act, and so recovery was
denied, though the lex fori would have allowed it.
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In an action to recover the statutory penalty assessed upon.
foreign insurance companies failing to comply with requireImpairment ments of the South Carolina law of March 2,
of contracts, 1897 (22 St. at Large, p. 461), the policy which
Foreign
Insurance

was offered as evidence of" doing business " was
originally
issued three years before the passage of
l

Companiest

the Act, in 1894. The only "business" alleged
was in connection with this one policy, and the defendant
contended that to assess the penalty on this evidence would
violate the contract clause of the United States Constitution.
This defence was construed by the court as an argument that
" the defendant having been permitted by this state to do business within its borders at the time the policy was issued, in
1894, the state could not afterwards, by the Act of 1897,
impose any new conditions." The answer the court makes
is very short: " . . . . this state may either grant or refuse a
license to a foreign corporation . . . . and the grant may be
either absolute or conditional . . . . " citing Bank v. Earle,

13 Pet. 519, and the usual authorities. It seems doubtful
whether the court has met the real point of the defendant:
Sandall v. Atlanta MZ. L. -1. Co. (Supreme Court of South
Carolina), 31 S. E. 230.

The Kansas Court of Appeals, Northern Department,
follows the universal rule in upholding the Sunday laws:
The conviction of
Police Power Nesbit v. State, 54 Pac. 326.
Sunday Laws Nesbit for shaving a customer on Sunday was

affirmed. The court refers to Peo. v. Havnor, 149
N. Y. 195 (1896), which decided the New York Sunday Barbering Act to be constitutional. That Act (Laws of 1895, Chap823) makes it a misdemeanor for any person to carry on or
engage in the business or work of a barber on the first day of the
week, except that, in the city of New York and in the village
of Saratoga Springs, such business may be carried on until one
o'clock of the afternoon of that day. The New York Court
of Appeals, Gray, Bartlett and Haight, JJ., dissenting, held,
that this law is a valid exercise of the police power, works no
deprivation of liberty or property within the meaning of the
constitution, and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
by denying the equal protection of the laws. The dissenting judges considered the work of a barber "a work of
necessity."
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CONTRACTS.

A and B had sustained a relation of trust and confidence
toward each other. Twenty months after such relation had
Confidential been terminated, A, on advice of counsel, and on
a thorough understanding of the facts, agreed to
Relation,
Undue
convey certain property to B. Held, that A
Influence
could not avoid the agreement on the ground that
he reposed great confidence in B and that B's influence due
to the former relations between them still remained: Banner
v. Rosser et al. (Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia), 3 1
S. E. 67.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that, where a
vendee has the right to rescind a contract of sale on the
ground of fraud of the vendor, the mere fact that
Rescission,
Fraud
the vendee attempted, after a delivery of the goods
to him, to sell the same, will not deprive him of this right:
Hoyle v. Southern Saw Works (Supreme Court of Georgia),
31 S. E. 137.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reiterated the rule
that while a purchase of stock on margin, for speculation, is
not a gambling transaction if it is the intention of
Stock
Gambling, the parties that a real purchase shall be made by
What
the broker, although the delivery may be postConstitutes poned or made to depend upon future conditions,
yet if it is the intention that there is not to be a delivery, but
that the account is to be settled on the basis of a rise or fall in
prices, it is a mere wager, and the contract cannot be enforced
by either party: Wagner v. Hildebrand,41 Atl. 34.

CORPORATIONS.

A general law authorizes the formation of corporations by
groups of persons who comply with the requirements which
the law specifies. One of the requirements is that
Irregular
Incorporation, the associates shall have an authorized stock subscription. In default of it the associates are
Rights
prohibited by the statute from doing business.
Against
Creditors

In Carroll v. Pacific National Bank, 54 Pac. 32,
it appears that those who united to form "The New West
Liquor Company" failed to comply with this important statutory requirement. When the organization went into the hands
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of a receiver, the receiver sued a third person to recover property alleged to have been received by him during the insolvency
of the organization by way of fraudulent preference. Shall
the defendant be permitted to set up in his own defence the
irregularity in the incorporation? The Supreme Court of
Washington, following the well-nigh universal rule, answers
this question in the negative. But what reason shall be
assigned for the decision ? " Having done business, the question cannot be raised, either by the corporation or one dealing
with it, to the injury or loss of other parties."
Suppose, however, the corporation were solvent: would a debtor be allowed
to make such a defence? Clearly not, although the rights of
"other parties" would not in such a case be involved. The
fact is that such decisions proceed upon an economic rather
than a legal basis. They are obviously just-and an appropriate legal principle upon which to explain them will doubtless
be formulated in due time. See 36 AM. LAw REG. & REv.
(N. S.), I8, i6i, "The Incidents of Irregular Incorporation."
In Haines v. Kinderbrook & H. Ry. Co., 53 N. Y. Suppl.
368, it appears that a plan of railroad reorganization provided
cent. of new
Right to Vote for the vesting of the title to 6o per
an Incident stock in the reorganization committee with power
of Legal Title to hold it and vote thereon for a period not exceedto Stock
ing five years. The plan having become operative,
two out of nine members died within the five years and a
minority stockholder undertook to restrain the survivors from
voting upon the committee stock. The plaintiffseems to have
supposed, and his attorney must have encouraged the view,
that because some of the members of the committee had died
and some had sold their private holdings the survivors ceased
to hold the legal title to the trust stock. The court found no
difficulty in disposing of this view and decided that the right
to vote followed the legal title and that the legal title was in
the members of the committee as trustees.

CRIMINAL LAW.

In State v. ilfichael, 23 So. 992, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana reiterates the rule that where the crime with which
a person stands charged is a felony, his attorney
Felony,
Arraignment is without authority to waive his arraignment
in his absence.
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In State v. Hull, 54 Pac. (Ore.) 159. It was held that wherethe owner of property employs a person to catch thieves, and
he, with the owner's consent, co-operates with theLarceny,
Taking
thieves in planning and carrying out the scheme,
Property with for the purpose of having them arrested, theOwner's
property is taken with his consent and the
consent
suspected thieves are not guilty of larceny.

DEEDS.

A deed, delivered in escrow, and fraudulently abstracted:
from the depository by the grantee without performing the
conditions on which it was to be delivered to him,
Escrow,
Unputhorized is void even in the hands of a bona fre purchaser;
DiL v, .Bristol Savings Bank (Supreme Court of
Delivery
Georgia), 31 S. E, Rep, 96.
The delivery to the solicitor of the grantee of an instrument
executed by the grantor will not convert the
Agent of
instrument from an escrow into a deed, provided
Grantee
the delivery is of such a character as to negative
its being a delivery to the grantee; Ibi.
Dellverytp

AVIDENCE,
The distinction between statements of opinion and those of
the impression produced as the result of observation is clearly
,
Statements Fs drawn in People v. Arrigheni, 54 Pac. (Cal.) 59I
to Matters of where on a trial for murder, notwithstanding that
Observatlon the Code excluded the opinion of other than
and
Impression,

intimate acquaintances where the issue is sanity,
witnesses were allowed to testify as to the appearOpinion
ance and manner of the defendant shortly after the homicideas to whether tney saw anything strange or peculiar in his
manner. The defence was that the prisoner was temporarily
insane by reason of illness apd an overdose of quinine. It was
held that this was not a statement of opinion as to sanity, but
of a matter of observation and was so distinguished from the
case of Carpenter's Estate, 102 Cal. 636, 36 Pac. 930, where
a witness not intimately acquainted with decedent being asked
how he appeared mentally, the question was rejected as being
an inquiry as to the witness' opinion as to decedent's sanity,
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and not merely calling for a description of his manner or conduct, or for a statement that he had acted rationally or
irrationally at a given time.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Drummer v. Drummer, 41 Atl. (N. J.) 149, is of some value,
both as a reminder that in New Jersey, as in some Southern
States, a bill for alimony will lie apart from any
Alimony,
Desertion,
divorce proceedings, and more particularly as a
Divorce

very good example of what does not constitute

desertion on the part of a husband. Many petty housekeeping
annoyances were recited by the wife, but the court refused her
a decree, relying on the familiar principles that nothing can
justify a wife's leaving her home except such a cause as will
entitle her to a divorce, and that the marriage promise to take
for better or worse must mean that minor offences shall.be
borne in silence.
It is well settled in some jurisdictions (as New York) that
even though the parties go to another state to be married, for
Marriage,

Evasion of

the purpose of escaping a prohibitory statute of
the state of their residence, the marriage will yet

Laws
be recognized as lawful in their own state, unless
the prohibition is based upon some deep principle of morality.

Norman v. Norman, 54 Pac. (Cal.) 143, is apparently a case of

first impression in this line. The parties had here left the
state where a public celebration was required by statute, and
going a few miles out on the ocean in a steamer, had married
each other by what they called the common law form. It was
decided, however, that there was no " common law of the
ocean," and that the marriage was therefore null and void.
A surprising number of cases have arisen with respect to
the meaning of deeds containing marriage settlements-the
Marriage

inference being that they are difficult to draw

Settlement, accurately.
In Coling v. Haden [1898], 2 Ch.
Interpretation 220, the deed contained a covenant by the hus-

band alone that all the real and personal estate acquired
during coverture by the wife should be settled in accordance
with the trusts of the settlement. It was held by Stirling, J.,
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after a review of the authorities, upon common-sense grounds,
that the parties could not have intended that the husband's
interest in his wife's property alone should be bound, and the
wife was held to have given her assent to the more liberal
construction by joining in the deed.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Allen v. Flood [1898], A. C. i, is likely to be the beginning,
instead of the end, of litigation upon the matter of interfering
between employer and employe. May v. Wood,
nd-ctng
Discharge,
Cause of
Action,

Sufficiency

5 N. E (Mass.) 19 1, is one of its first fruits. The
majority of the court, holding that this form of
action was quite different from an action for enticing servants away (see Walker v. Cronin, 107
Mass. 555), were of opinion that, in an action for

inducing a master to discharge a servant, if false and malicious statements are relied upon, they must be set out in the
declaration, "that the court may see whether any such effect
as is alleged could reasonably be attributed to the statements." Evidently the form of a declaration in slander is in
the mind of the court. Holmes, J. (with him Knowlton and
Morton JJ.), in an emphatic dissent, holds that, contrary to
Allen v. Flood, such action will lie "as well when the result is
effected by persuasion as when it is accomplished by fraud or
force, if the harm is inflicted simply from malevolence and
without some justifiable cause, such as competition in trade ;"
further, the doctrine applies to possible, as well as actual, contracts. It follows that the slander is not the gist of the
action in this case, and, therefore, need not be set out in the
declaration.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in an action to enjoin a
municipal corporation from issuing corporate bonds on the
ground that such issue would increase the debt of
Debt,
Limit
the municipality beyond the amount allowed by
law, has decided that money to be derived by the municipality
during the year from the sale of licenses cannot be considered
as offsets to the existing indebtedness: Rice v. City of

Milwaukee, 76 N. W. 341.

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Continued).

In an elaborate opinion containing an exhaustive review of
the authorities, Corliss, C. J., of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota, upholds the right of the legislature to
Improvedirect that all the expense of paving a city street
ments,
shall be assessed against the abutting property,
Local
Assessments even though the property is
not benefited to the
extent of the assessment: Ralphz v. City of Fargo et al., 76
N. W. 242.
A municipal government, organized under an act of the
legislature, subsequently adjudged to be unconstitutional, is a
Unconstitutional government defacto, and its officers are officers
de facto, until ousted through proper legal
Charter,
Officers De Facto proceedings: State ex rel. Attorney-General v.
Mayor, Etc., of Town of Dover (Supreme Court of New Jersey), 41 Atl. 98.

NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of N. Y., in Weiss v. Met. St. Ry.
Co., 53 N. Y. Suppl. 449, decided that a child between eight
Contributory and nine years of age, who attempts to cross a

city street in the middle of a block, either without
looking for an approaching street car, or in blind
and heedless disregard of its rapid approach, is guilty of contributory negligence.
Negligence,
Child

What duty the proprietor of an office building owes to the
people using the elevators in his building was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Oberndorferv. Pabst,
Office
Buildings,

76 N. W.

338.

In

that case the elevator had

been started upward suddenly, just as the plaintiff's
intestate was about to step into it, whereby he fell down the
shaft and was killed. The court held that the proprietor of
such an office building is bound to have the passenger elevators operated with the highest degree of skill and care commensurate with or proportionate to the possibility of injury to
passengers. This is a duty of which he cannot discharge
himself by delegating it to employes however experienced or
skillful. (The decision of the lower court was reversed on a
question of evidence.)
Elevators
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PLEADING AN4D PRACTICE.

In the case of an application by a street railway company
for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Public
Peremptory Works, commanding respondent to issue a permit
Mandamus for the opening of a public street, which was reCan be
sisted, the court denied a peremptory writ, but
Allowed oniy

In case ofcle
Legal right on
Undisputed
acts

granted an alternative mandamus: Forty-second St.
R. W. Co. v. Co//is, 5 3 N. Y. Suppl. 669. This is
an adherence to the well-settled principle that,
where a remedy of such a character as a peremp-

tory mandamus is invoked, there must be a clear and unquestioned legal right. The court cites People v. Wendell, 71 N. Y.
171; People v. Greene Co., 64 N. Y. 6oo.
It appears to be the practice, under Codes of Civil Procedure, in some of the states, for attorneys to appear specially,
Oeneral and limiting their appearance to some particular purSpecial
pose. It was recently held by the Supreme Court
Appearance of South Dakota, in a case where the defendant
only intended to appear to take advantage of the defective
service of the summons, but the motion to quash was signed
by his counsel, with the addition "attorney for defendant,"
that this was not to be construed as a general appearance.
From which it would seem that the old permission to appear,
"de bene esse," is substantially given under new codes: Reedy
v. Howard, 76 N. W. 304.
By Section 6, Article I, of the Constitution of Nebraska, it is
provided that " the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
Quo Warranto, Upon a quo warranto to test the right of the
issue,
respondent to hold the office of mayor there
Trial by Jury
was a trial before a referee of the issues raised
by the information of the relator and the answer thereto.
Exceptions were taken to the findings of the referee, but the
principal question was whether or not a jury trial in that state
is demandable as a matter of right. The opinion of the
Supreme Court was written by Ryan, C. J., and gives a very
interesting historical examination of the writ of quo warranto
with numerous citations of authorities, and with the result
stated thus : "It is clear there exists such uncertainty as to
the rule at common law, that, if possible, the problem should
be solved by resort to fixed principles, rather than the disputed
teachings of uncertain precedents." Then, after a discussion
of the State Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure, it was
held that provisions of the law of Nebraska, the respondent
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was not entitled as a matter of right to demand a trial by jury.
The dissent of Norval, J., is also of much interest. In his
opinion he asserts that "the invariable practice at common
law, in information in the nature of quo warranto and in writs
of quo warranto, was to try disputed issues of fact by a jury."
He further considers the question under the provisions of the
Code; but we note the case in this column because of its
extensive reference to precedents of the common law, and the
different views of their authority in the two opinions of the
judges above named: State v. Moores, 76 N. W. 530.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The agent's right to commissions is generally said to accrue
upon making a sale. Stone v. Argersinger, 53 N. Y. Suppl.
Commissions, 63, seems to suggest that this must be accepted

with some qualifications, at least, when his conComtract is for commissions on "collections."
missions were not allowed on unproductive orders, as those
where the goods were returned; but were allowed on those
sales which the principal was himself unable to carry out.
When
Allowed

The same formalities only are required in ratification that
would have been required in an original authorization. It
Ratification was therefore held, in Lynch v. Smith; 54 Pac.
(Colo.) 634, that a verbal ratification of the act of
the agent in affixing the principal's name as surety upon a
bond was sufficient, inasmuch as the bond need not have been
under seal.

RECEIVERS.

The practice in respect to appointment of receivers varies
somewhat in different jurisdictions. In New Jersey, however,
Appointment, as appears in the case of Fort W4ayne Flectric
Insolvent
Corporation

Coqp. v. Franklin Electric Light Co., 41 Atl.

(N. J.) 2i7, the rule is that if a corporation is

insolvent and there is no reasonable prospect that, if let alone,
it will become solvent, a receiver should be appointed; nor
does the word " resume " in the statute mean that a corporation must have completely suspended its business before- such
appointment may be made.
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It is well settled that a person appointed as a referee is
incompetent to act as such, if, at the time he is counsel for one
It is immaterial
Counsel for of the parties to the reference.
that the referee appears to have been uninfluenced
Public
Corporation, by his employment by one of the parties or that
High
he is a man of high integrity; the law requires
Character

that all appearance

of evil should be avoided.

Whether this rule applies where the referee's employer is a
-public corporation, like a municipality, as well as where only
private parties are concerned, was at issue in Forunato v.
.I ayor, etc., of New York, 52 N. Y. Suppl. 873. In that case
the person appointed as referee was acting as special counsel
for the city in several cases. The court held that the public
.character of the party retaining the referee made no difference,
and that his appointment was invalid.
•SALRS.

If the dealer in a given article adopts and uses a label so
.nearly identical with that of a rival as to establish, upon
inspection, not only the fraudulent intention to
Unfair
-Competition, deceive the public, but the certainty that they
Use of Label must be deceived thereby, a suit against such
.dealer, based on unfair competition, may be sustained without
.proof that persons have in fact been so deceived: McLougldin
v. Singer (Sup. Court, App. Div. N.Y.), 53 N. Y. Suppl. 342.
.SURETYSHIP.

Ordinarily an extension of time given by the creditor to the
.principal debtor will, of course, release the surety; but this is
not so where the extension is granted by a bank
Release of
Surety
whose officers were themselves the sureties. They
-cannot, by taking renewal notes, be allowed to exonerate
themselves: Leon/art v. Bank, 76 N. W. (Neb.) 452.
'TRUSTS.

Barroll v. Foreman, 40 AtI. 283. A and B, executors of
.an estate, sold property belonging to the estate and the sale
was confirmed by the court. The money paid in
Trustee,
Llabilty for accordance with the decree was received by B,
Wrong of

Co-Trustee

who misappropriated it.

A, ignorant of the fraud

and believing the money to be in bank, joined B

in asking to have an audit of their accounts.

An audit was
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filed distributing the amount. A then, for the first time, discovered B's fraud. In a bill filed by A the audit was set
aside on the ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that A might have discovered the money was not
in bank, and that he was responsible to the amount found dueby audit to cestui que trust.
This case would seem to go farther than Candlerv. Tillett,
22 Bea. 257, and Dix v. Burford, 19 Bea. 409; see, also,.
Maccabin v. Cromwell, 7 G. & J. 157 ; Spenser v. Spenser &
Corning, i i Paige, 299; Homer v. Lehman, 2 Ired. Eq. 594,
where a trustee was held liable for laches of his co-trustee ;
Acheson v. Robertson, 3 Rich. Eq. 132, and Grzffin v. Macaulley, 7 Gratt. 476. Another interesting case on the samesubject is that of In re Westerfield, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 25.
In this last case a trustee was, with the consent of the
cestui que trustent, excluded by his co-trustee from the management of the estate. Matters being in this condition, theexcluded trustee discovered that his co-trustee had misappropriated the property of the estate to a very large extent. Instead of informing the beneficiaries, he participated in themanagement of the estate with the fraudulent trustee-doing
many unauthorized acts, but with no evil intent-his object
being to secure the property from his fraudulent co-trustee
and protect the estate from the loss. The court held that,.
while he would not have been liable had he informed the beneficiaries on the discovery of the fraud of his co-trustee, his
subsequent participation and unauthorized acts, though with
the best intention, and probably with a beneficial result to the
estate, rendered him liable for any sums which his co-trustee
could not make good to the estate. Of course, the fact that
he had acted as he did, under advice of counsel, did not excuse him.

